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Abstract
The most effective  regulators  in developing countries  are  that all these determinants-tariffs,  subsidies, quality,
following remarkably  similar approaches.  The main  investments,  and other service obligations-are
common  element across  "best practice"  countries  is the  interrelated  and jointly determine the rate  of return. At
use  of relatively  simple quantitative  models of operators'  every revision,  the rules of the game for the regulator are
behavior and constraints  to measure  the impact of  exactly the same:  to figure out the changes  in the cost of
regulatory  decisions on some  key financial  and economic  capital and to adjust the variables driving the rate of
indicators of concern to the  operators,  the users,  and the  return to ensure  that it continues to be consistent with
government.  The authors provide  an introduction  to the  the cost of capital.
design and use of these models. They draw on lessons  If they can  draw on reasonable  data,  these models  do
from international  experience  in  industrial and  everything any financial model would  do for the day-to-
developing countries  in ordinary or extraordinary  day management  of a company  but take a longer term
revisions and in the context of contract renegotiations.  view and include  an explicit identification  of the key
Simplifying somewhat,  these models  force regulators  regulatory  instruments.  They can monitor the
to recognize  that, in  the long run,  private  operators need  consistency  between cash flow generated  by the business
to at least cover their opportunity cost of capital,  on the one hand and debt service  and operational
including  the various types of risks specific  to the  expense needs on the other to address the main concerns
country,  the sector, or the projects with which they are  of the operators. They can  also account for a large
involved.  Because these  variables change  over time,  number of key policy factors including access  and
scheduled revisions are  needed to allow for adjustments  affordability  concerns for various  types of consumers.
in the key determinants  of the rate  of return  of the  They generally  account for the sensitivity of operators
operator.  These revisions are  a recognition of the fact  and users to various regulatory  design options.
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This paper provides an introduction to the design and use of financial and economic
models that transparently  quantify the impact of regulatory  decisions.  It  draws on  lessons
from  international  experience  in  developed  and  developing  countries  in  ordinary  or
extraordinary  revisions  and  in  the  context  of  contract  renegotiations.'  The  sample  of
experiences  to draw from is still modest  and growing  slowly. During the  1990s,  over 200
regulatory  agencies  have  been  created  in  developing  countries  as  part  of infrastructure
restructuring.  Many are  yet to adopt  transparent  regulatory  processes.  Many  more fail to
rely on  analytical  frameworks  capable of addressing the most common concerns  included
in regulators'  mandates.
The  most  effective  regulators  in  developing  countries  are  following  remarkably
similar  approaches.  They  essentially  rely on  "UK-type"  regulatory  processes  adapted  to
local constraints  and concerns.  The main common element across "best practice" countries
is the use of relatively simple quantitative models of operators'  behavior and constraints to
measure  the impact of regulatory decisions  on some key financial  and economic  indicators
of concern to the operators, the users  and the government.
Simplifying somewhat,  these models force regulators  to recognize  that, in the long
run, private operators need  to at least cover their  opportunity cost of capital,  including the
various types of risks specific to the country, the sector,  or the projects with which they are
involved.  Because  these  variables  change  over  time,  scheduled  revisions  are  needed  to
allow  for adjustments  in the  key determinants  of the  rate of return of the  operator.  These
revisions are a recognition  of the fact that all these determinants--tariffs,  subsidies, quality,
investments  and other service obligations--are  interrelated and jointly determine the rate of
return. At every revision,  the rules  of the  game for the regulator  are exactly the  same:  to
figure out the changes  in the cost of capital  and to adjust  the variables  driving the rate  of
return to ensure that it continues to be consistent  with the cost of capital.
These  models have  to be based  on sound data collection  processes  for  each of the
key  decision  indicators.  The  most  effective  of these  models  draw  on  the  information
collected  as  part  of  the  asset  valuation  process  undertaken  in  the  context  of  the
"privatization"  of a service.2 This is the ideal base line.  In practice, during the  1990s, few
privatization  commissions took these into account.  In many cases,  the consultants  used  to
prepare the privatization  did not even leave copies  of the financial models  they developed
for  the  governments.  This  means  that  in  many  cases,  regulators  have  had  to  start  data
collection efforts from scratch as part of tariff or contract revisions.
lIt also  draws on the  lessons  from  the development  of macroeconomic  accounting  systems.  It  has always
seemed  strange  to  us  that  governments  would  consider  normal  the  allocation  of resources  to  generate
macroeconomic  accounts  while  doubting  the  value  of generating  simular  accounts  for the  monitoring  of
public enterprises  or for the regulation of privatized public services monopolies.
Throughout  the book the  concept of privatization  reflects  a wide  definition  which  covers  actual  sales  of
assets  as well as concessions  or licenses  of services in which  there is no initial transfer of property from the
government to the operators.3
If they  can  draw  on  reasonable  data,  these  models  do  everything  any  financial
model would do for the day-to-day management of a company but take a longer term  view
and include an  explicit identification  of the key regulatory  instruments.  They can monitor
the  consistency  between  cash  flow  generated  by the  business  on  the  one  hand and  debt
service  and operational  expense needs  on  the  other  to  address  the  main  concerns  of the
operators.  They can also account for a large number of key policy factors including access
and affordability concerns  for various types  of consumers.  They generally account  for the
sensitivity of operators and users to various regulatory design options.
The  rest  of the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  offers  a  definition  of
regulatory models.  Section 3 discusses the demand for regulation.  Section 4 focuses on the
need to match regulatory objectives and instruments. Section 5 reviews the main aspects of
an operator's finances  that the regulators  are expected to understand and internalize in their
monitoring  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  various  instruments  that  address  regulatory
objectives.  Section 6 concludes.
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Regulatory  models  are  essentially  "improved"  or  "expanded"  financial  models
designed  to provide  a  rigorous  analytical  tool  allowing  regulators  to address  their  most
predictable  concerns  in a consistent way. They calculate  the internal  rate of return (just like
a  financial  model  would)  accounting  for  all  contractual  constraints  imposed  on  the
operators.  In particular,  they allow the regulator to account for social  concerns  and for the
behavior  of  the  various  agents.  Unlike  a  typical  financial  mode,  they  also  allow  the
simulation  of the  consequences  of any policy or behavioral  change  on the various  actors
(users, operators and government).
However  detailed  these  regulatory  models  are,  they  all  follow  a  very  similar
structure  across  regulators,  as  summarized  in Figure  1. Figure  1 shows that these models
are built on an  initial data base (summarizing the physical and financial performance of the
company,  including  most  of  the  accounting  information  regularly  collected  by  the
operator),  an identification of the main regulatory instruments  (e.g. tariff structure, quality
options,  investment speed and timing,..) and some economic  parameters  (e.g. demographic
characteristics  of  the  area  of  operation,  macroeconomic  indicators  driving  demand,
efficiency levels, the sensitivity of users to changes in income and prices ....).
Next, they rely on explicit assessments  of the expected  impact on cash flows of the
main  actors'  reaction  (users  and operators)  to  the regulatory  instruments.  This  is  done
through  an  explicit  modeling of the  functional  relations  between consumption  levels  and
instruments.  The  assessment  of these  reactions  drives  the  financial  equilibrium  for the
operator  and can  be  done  at  a  fairly  detailed  level  for the  main  categories  of costs  and
revenue.4
Figure 1
The  building  blocks of regulatory  models
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Once  the regulator  has  a  good  assessment  of the  operator's  situation  based on  a
larger  set of performnance  indicators  and the specific  regulatory regime selected (price cap,
profit  sharing  or  rate  of return),  it can  then  assess  the  revenue  it  is going  to allow  the
operator to collect through its tariff.  The equilibrium  tariff is the one that generates  a net
present value of 0 for the investment or the operation,  which is equivalent to say that the
internal rate of return (IRR) is  equal to the firm's cost of capital (CoC). This assessment is
driven by the cash flow  forecast  and builds  it into the forecasted  income statement of the
operator  through  a complex  set  of modules.  These  sheets  are  use  to  generate  the  main
monitoring  indicators  upon  which  a  regulator  needs  to  focus.  Once  these  indicators  are
acceptable,  the final average tariff is known. Agreement between  operators  and regulators
usually requires  multiple rounds of discussion but in each round,  until convergence  or until
the regulator decides  to stop the "negotiation",  the process  is exactly the same.  The result
is  a  continuous  series  of equilibria  (between  tariffs,  investment,  timing,  aand  al  other
contractual  obligations).  The regulator then has to decide which  level maximizes the joint
welfare of the primary stakeholders  (users, government and firm).
This  generic  definition  can  be  complemented  by  a  brief  summary  of  their
contributions  to  the  implementation  of regulatory  policies.  They  offer  four  main  such
contributions:
*  Quantitative rigor in regulatory  assessments:  The  models  allow  the  regulators  to
avoid  subjective  or  impressionistic  assessments  of  the  impact  of their  decisions.
"What should  be the impact of devaluation on a tariff?"  is a question that requires an5
understanding of the financial  structure  of the  company  (how  much foreign debt does
it  include)  and  which  can  only  be  usefully  answered  quantitatively.  "What  is  the
impact  on the  tariff  of a  change  in the  country  risk  premium  in  between  two  tariff
revision  periods?"  is  a  no  less  demanding  question  in  terms  of  numbers  and  is
probably  one of the  most common  questions  regulators  in developing  countries  need
to be able  to  quantify.  Without  the rigor  imposed  by the  kinds  of models  presented
here,  the responses  to  these  questions  are  at best  unreliable  and  are  likely  to be  held
in  suspicion  by  both  user  and  the  regulated  firm.  The  rigor  of the  results  will  be
limited  by  the  quality  of data  and  robustness  of  the  assumptions  included  in  the
model.  But even with weak data and strong assumptions  these models can give a good
guide  as  to  the  sensitivity  of the  equilibrium  to  the  use  of different  instruments  as
well as changes  in the parameters.  As such, the model also  serves as a guide  to where
the  main  efforts  have  to  be  in  terms  of  data  collection  and  functional  relations
estimations.
o  Distinction between economic  and limancial  concerns:  They allow  the regulators  to
account  for the  financial  and accounting  concerns  of the  operators  without  having  to
give  up  on  monitoring  the  wider  concerns  of  society.  The  operator's  investment
decisions  and the  consumption  decisions  are endogenous.  The models  recognize  that
regulators  may  have  to account  for social  concerns.  They  are  designed  to assess  the
trade-offs between various  types of resource allocation problems  and can  also provide
useful  inputs into  the fiscal budgetary  process  when subsidies are needed.  All  of these
features  make  them  more  appropriate  for  the  regulator's  concerns  than  traditional
financial  models.  We  label  them  "quasi-economic"  models  because  they  still  fall
short  of  what  economic  models  do  for  policymakers.  For  instance,  they  rely  on
market prices  rather than  shadow prices,  ignore  externalities  such as  the environment
effects  of operations  and  any  other distortion  on the  factor  or product  markets.  The
reason  for  this  is  that there  usually  are  no data available  to quantify  these  economic
effects,  and  in  general,  these  impacts  would  be  out  of the  scope  of the  regulator's
responsibility.  Nonetheless  these  models  are  flexible  so  if for  any  reason one  would
want to introduce any particular effect,  it can be perfectly  modeled.
Consistency  in  accounting  for  multiple  concerns:  They  force  consistent
quantifications  of  the  financial  and  (quasi-)economic  viewpoints  of  regulatory
decisions.  From  a financial  perspective,  the  regulator  is  asked  to  focus  on synthetic
indicators  such  as  the  cost  of  capital  and  the  internal  rate of  return,  or equivalent
concepts  and  to understand  the  trade-offs  of various  regulatory  or  policy  instrument
combinations  in terms of their impacts on these indicators.  "How will a government's
request  to  revise  a  contract  in  terms  of  investment  levels  or  speed  influence  the
profitability  of the  business  and  how  should  tariff  levels  be  adjusted  to  restore  the
original  profitability?"  This  is  the  kind  of question  that  can  only  be  answered  by  a
model  that  recognizes  all  the  interactions  between  the  various  decision  variables.
From  an economic  perspective,  the main  concerns  of the regulator  are  to  ensure the
continuity  of the  service,  to  achieve  various  types  of efficiency  (optimal  resources6
allocation and  costs minimization  while  ensuring that prices are consistent with costs)
and  to  meet  the  political  mandates  in  terms of social  and  redistributive  concerns,  if
any.  "Has  the operator returned  any of the benefits  accrued  from reducing  operating
costs to the consumers?"  is an example  of an efficiency concern that a regulator must
grapple  with.  "How  consistent  with  the  poorest  users'  ability  to  pay  are  tariff
adjustments  to  compensate  for  unexpected  changes  in  the  macroeconomic
conditions?"  is  the sort of social  concern that regulators  must be able to address.  The
multiplicity  of variables  to be simultaneously  taken into account  is  a major  challenge
which  has  not  always  been  met  by  regulators.  In many  of these  failures,  the  main
victim  is  the  one  least  capable  of arguing  its  case.  In practice,  these  are  often  the
poorest  users and  it is not  uncommon to see  social  concerns  left  out of the regulatory
decision making process.
Transparency  and accountability:  These  models  are  also  crucial  in  allowing  better
transparency  in  monitoring  the  behavior  not  only  of  the  operators  but  also  the
regulators.  They  reduce  the  scope  for  corruption,  collusion  and  capture  or  the
appearance  of those conflicts.  At the very  least,  they  significantly  increase their costs.
They  ease  the job  of  watchdogs  to  ensure  that  there  are  no  abuses  and  that  the
expected  gains  from  reform  are  indeed  achieved  and  shared  with  the  users.  By
increasing  the  transparency  of the  factors  driving  the  allowed  rate  of return  of  the
operator,  ensuring that it covers the expected  cost of capital of the company  until the
next tariff revision  and by  increasing  the transparency  of the factors  that  increase  the
operators'  cost of doing business,  the models provide  a regulatory  tool  around  which
consultation  processes  can  be  organized.  This  is  not  to  say  that  there  will  be  no
discussion.  In  fact,  public  hearings  should  facilitate  the  discussion  of  the  main
elements  to  be  addressed  by  the  model  and  give  an  opportunity  for  all  actors  to
intervene.  Ultimately,  however,  the regulator will  usually have to decide  on objective
technical  elements  rather  than  subjective  political  grounds.  This  is  what  will  make
regulation  fairer,  more  efficient  and  less  subject  to  political  interference  and/or
corruption  and  will  eventually  reduce the up to now  high regulatory  risks assessed  by
investors  in public  services  in  developing  countries  with the  excessive  opportunities
for  political  interference.  In  this  way,  the  model  becomes  an  essential  tool  for
explaining  tariff  increases  or  decreases,  the  rebalancing  of  rate  structures  or  other
sensitive decisions  such as postponed investment targets.
Note  that  even  the  best regulatory  models  are  by necessity  simplifications  of the
interactions  they  are  supposed  to  represent.  The  quality  of  the  model  depends  on the
strength of the assumptions of income and consumption  profiles of the users or the ability
of  the  operator  to  improve  its  efficiency.  How  robust  these  assumptions  are,  in turn,
depends  on the quality  of the data available.  Regulators  should  never forget that the data
they  need  must  match  the  goals  of the  model.  The  regulator  must  always  arbitrate
between  the  costs  (imposed  on  the  operator  and  the  users)  of  generating  more
information  and  the benefits  of doing  so.  In many  countries,  the preliminary  information
available is  so limited that the initial  assumptions  used in the model have  to be strong.  As7
time  goes  by,  the  information  asymmetry  between  regulators  and  operators  shrinks  and
the importance  of the assumptions  decreases  likewise.  The focus turns  to medium to long
run concerns and hence  their data requirements are likely  to be lower.
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To  assess  more  specifically  what  variables  these  models  must account  for,  it  is
useful to understand the needs emerging  from the demand side  of regulation.  The demand
for regulation  in  industries  operated  by monopolies  as  expressed  by  the  public  at  large
generally tends to focus on a combination of current tariff and current service quality levels
because  these  are the  two  main concerns  of most users  of public  services.  But there  is
more  to  it. Tariffs  are  an economic  signal  not  only for users  to decide  on their  levels  of
consumption  but  also  for operators  to  decide  how much  and  how  fast to  invest  and for
creditors  to  decide  how  much  to  lend  to  these  operators.  Tariffs  also  have  a  political
dimension,  which is one of the main constraints  to many restructuring  processes  and is at
the  core  of many  conflicts  during  ordinary  or  extraordinary  regulatory  reviews.  Tariff
changes generally  make the headlines  of all the major media  sources, not always fairly,  in
particular when no effort is made to provide analytically sound comparisons.
Many casual  observers  fail to  see the  linkages between today's tariffs,  on the one
hand  and cost, quality,  investment,  social  service  obligations  and tomorrow's tariff on the
other.  The type of models discussed  here allow recognition  of the  linkages between  these
variables  and, in fact, all other variables of importance  to operators, users and government.
Each of these is subject to implicit or explicit negotiations built into the regulatory process.
The more analytical the interactions, the fairer the process.
To see this,  it may be useful  to think of the regulation of privatized  infrastructure
monopolies  as a "game"  among the service providers,  the users and the government.  The
regulator  is the referee and  tries to enforce the rules of that game.  In a nutshell,  the rules
of the game require that:
*  the  monopoly  minimizes  its  costs,  delivers  on  its  service  provision
responsibilities  and pays its liabilities to the government,
*  all  users  (commercial,  industrial,  agricultural,  and residential,  as  well  as  public
sector users) see their demand met and pay their bills,  and
*  the  government  delivers  on  its  commitments,  whether  financial  (e.g.  subsidies)
or  other  (e.g.  expropriations,  contract  enforcement,  and  non-interference  in
operations  or regulatory decision making)
In addition,  the  regulator  is  expected  to  ensure that  the  gains  from  privatization
are  distributed  fairly  among  operators,  consumers  and  government.  The  stakes  of this
game  are  generally  quite  high.  In  Argentina's  utilities  privatization,  the  extra-income
generated  by  the  economy  when  the  infrastructure  sector  is  well  regulated  was  assessed8
to at least 0.3%  of GDP.3 How fair the distribution of these  kinds of gains  is depends on
the fine print  in the regulator's  rule book,  meaning  the  specific  design of the regulatory
regime,  the degree of independence  from political  interference  with regulatory  decisions
or the degree of capture of the regulators by the operators,  among other things.
In addition to the  constraints  imposed by this fine print,  the regulator faces  a very
practical major problem:  it has always  less  information than the private service providers
on their performance,  making any assessment of gains quite a challenge.  Indeed, there is
generally  very  little  relevant  historical  data  available  from  public  enterprises  from  a
regulatory  perspective.  In  particular,  detailed  information  about  customers  (e.g.,
consumption  habits,  ability  and  willingness  to  pay  given  tariff levels  and  even  income
levels  of communities  or  households),  detailed  asset  registries,  or reliable  depreciated
asset values  are often missing. Most of these data have  to be generated  during the design
of the  privatization  and  regulatory  processes.  The  design of the  "privatization"  process
should  therefore  ideally  address  the  future  information  requirements  of  effective
regulation  of the  new  private  monopoly.  The  regulatory  processes  should  have  been
designed  with the future information  flows between regulators  and operators  specified as
part of the contractual  arrangements.
When this has  not been done,  information  concerns  appear  as regulators prepare
for  their  first  tariff  revision  or  in  the  context  of a  renegotiation.  Formal  information
exchanges  must  be  organized  on  processes,  data  and  the  timing  of the  interactions.
These exchanges  of information have  to be built around the  "analytical"  framework used
by  regulators  to make  their decisions.  It is designed to check  for the  internal  consistency
between  all  of the demands  made  by the government  in the  specification of the contract,
the  allowed  tariff  levels  and  structure  and  the  financing  requirements  of the  operators.
What the model essentially  does is ensure  that the internal rate of return, or an equivalent
concept,  at  least covers  a reasonable assessment of the cost of capital  of the operator.
While collecting information about the existing  fixed assets,  the likely demand  of
different  categories  of  consumers  at  various  tariff  levels,  and  current  and  potential
operating  costs,  the privatization  team will build a model  to estimate  tariffs and test their
ability  to  provide a  fair return  for  operator given  corresponding  investment  needs.  The
model  should  ideally  be  built by the  privatization  team at  the  outset  of the  reform  and
should  then be passed on to the regulator,  who is expected  to maintain and update  it.  In
these  cases,  the financial  modeling of the initial transaction generates  a useful baseline  in
terms of the  base  value  of the  assets  owned  by  the  monopolies  at the  beginning  of the
contract  and  sets  up  the  future  flows  of  incremental  information  (on  investment,
productivity  gains,  quality  improvements,  etc.)  between  the  regulator  and  the
concessionaires.  This  base  value  of the  assets  is critical  in assisting  future  regulators  to
set price controls  at periodic  intervals throughout the concession period.4 But it is clearly
'  See  Chisari,  Estache  and  Romero  (1999):  "Winners  and  Losers  of Argentina's  Utilities  Privatizations",
World Bank Economic  Review, vol. 2.
4 Of course, the larger the number of bidders, the better the information generated.9
not enough  and additional  sources  of information have to be built into the  concessioning
process.
The various ways  in which  information  can  and  should be  generated  for the sake
of transparency  is  emerging  as  one  of the  key  outstanding  concerns  of regulators.  The
transparency  of regulatory  processes  and  educating  the  public  at  large,  particularly  the
media,  of its importance  may be one of the major failures of the reforms  implemented  in
the  1990s.  Users  forget  how  bad  the  services  were  before  privatization,  they  forget
rationing and they forget past prices.  Unless there are constant reminders of the evolution
of quality  and prices  and  analytically  sound  indicators  that track the  evolution  and  show
trade-offs,  the regulatory  process  is  subject to political  manipulation of information.  The
models  allow regulators  to help the accountability  of not only  the players but also  of the
public.  The  regulators  cannot forget,  however,  that some  variables  will  always attract a
greater  attention  and  current  tariff  levels  are  often  the  main  focus  for  very  different
reasons.
Indeed,  if there  is  one  thing  that  the  1990s  experience  with  infrastructure  reform
teaches politicians and casual observers is that success  is often perceived  to be related to
what happens  to tariff levels.  The need  to cut  costs,  and hence  tariffs,  by increasing  the
productive  efficiency  of public  services  may have  been  one of the  main  reasons  for the
"privatization"  and restructuring of the sector  in the UK.  The need  to bring tariffs  in line
with  costs  to  allow the  financing  of these  services'  operations  and their  expansion  to  a
larger  share  of the  population  may  have  been  one  of the  main  goals  of the  reforms  in
Argentina,  Chile,  Bolivia  and Peru.  In  some  sectors,  the  cut  in costs  resulting  from  new
management techniques  or technology introduced by the private operators was sufficient  to
allow a tariff decline,  even compared to the  controlled tariff of the public enterprises  that
used to provide the services  (as was the case for Argentina's gas and electricity sectors).  In
others  cases, costs were  cut but the initial controlled tariff levels were so far from even the
lowest  costs, that prices  eventually had to be increased  (as was the case  for power in Peru
or water in Bolivia).  In the latter cases, the desirability of the reform was, and continues to
be  questioned  by  opponents,  irrespective  of the  effective  success  achieved  in  terms  of
increased  coverage,  employment or quality.
What history  also  teaches  regulators is that  they cannot  afford not to  educate  all
parties  on the  mechanics  of regulation.  It is  crucial  for  everyone  involved  to understand
what  drives tariffs,  particularly  that tariffs,  including  subsidies,  must be in line  with the
cost  imposed  on  the  operators  through  various  contractual  obligations.  When  there  is
misalignment between the tariff and costs, it means  one of two things:  either the contract is
too demanding or the government needs to co-finance  the contractual  obligations.  From the
regulator's viewpoint,  this means is that the tariff regime defines the degree of government
commitment  to  simultaneously  address  productive  efficiency  (cost  minimization),
allocative  efficiency  (the extent to which tariffs  reflect  costs),  distributional  concerns  and10
fiscal  concerns.  In addition,  its publicity/transparency  and clarity reveals the government's
commitment to regulatory accountability.  5
Regulators  should also learn  from history that it is important  for the media and the
public  at  large  to  understand  that  tariffs  are  part  of a  larger  picture.  It  is  an  important
variable  because  of its  immediate  political  visibility,  but  it  is  only  one  variable.  It is
important for  all  to  see  that just  as the  users'  ability to  pay  is limited by their  income,
operators  have  an  ability  to  produce  that  is limited by their  ability to  generate  cash to
service their  debt and provide  a reasonable  return to  equity holders.  The main  difference
between  the  two  is  that  operators  and  their  creditors  have  alternatives  whereas
governments  that  have  not  managed  to  generate  enough  resources  to  finance  the  large
investment  needs  of the  public  service  sectors  or  have  been  unable  to  operate  those
services efficiently,  will have to partner with the private sector. Regardless  of the operator,
average tariffs  will have to cover all non-subsidized costs and generate a reasonable return.
This means  that  social  concerns  cannot  be  addressed  through  direct  control  of average
tariffs. They have to be tackled instead through the design of a tariff regime which includes
tariff levels  and  structures  to ensure  that the  operators  of services  with declining  average
costs  can  avoid  losing  money  in  their businesses  as  well  as  with specific  rules  for  cost
inputs,  efficiency levels or access  prices to common facilities.6
This  analytical  vision of the regulatory process begs for a matching analytical  tool.
All of the main concerns must be accounted for by the model if it is to help the regulator in
ensuring that the trade-offs  can be seen and understood by all. This is how the tools make
all parties, regulators, users and operators, accountable.  But before getting to the modeling,
it may be useful to review the trade-offs.
IMPROPER  I
Most regulatory regimes try to meet multiple objectives,  the result of the multiple
concerns  government  try  to  address  simultaneously.  It  is  not  uncommon  to  find
governments  want to  minimize  simultaneously  the  fiscal  costs  of public  services  whole
ensuring  full coverage the population  as quickly  as possible at prices  as  low as  possible.
The  ranking of these  goals  varies  across  countries  and  in many  instances  trade-offs  are
unavoidable.  The  regulatory  challenge  then  becomes  the  need  to  consider  vanous
instrument  combinations  as  a  way  of  simultaneously  meeting  primary  and  secondary
5We define  the tariff regime  as the  set of rules that spells out the pricing rules  (levels and structure) and all
the additional norms that explain how the tanff levels and structures  are set and can be changed.
6  We  will  not  deal  with  all  of these  in  this  document.  Efficiency  levels  and  various  concepts  of cost
benchmarking  are discussed  in Coelli,  Estache, Perelman  and Trujillo (2002)  and access prices are discussed
in  Valetti  and  Estache  (1998).  This  is  a particularly  important  problem  in  the  electricity  sector.  Indeed,
generators,  distributors  and  suppliers  all  need to rely on the  distribution  lines to  supply electncity. In some
countries,  for instance,  generators  need them to deliver on contracts signed directly with large users.  Similar
problems  arise  in  the  telecommunications  sector  where  long  distance  and  portable  service  providers  both
need  to  access  the  local  loops.  Since  competition  in  these  services  is  impossible  without  access  to  the
monopolistic  facility,  the  problem  of  access  prices  and  rules  is  vital  to  ensuring  that  the  benefits  of
competition eventually  reach the final users.  This goes beyond the scope of matters  we cover here.11
objectives  or at  least minimizing  the need  to face  socially and politically  difficult  trade-
offs.
4.1. Regulatory objectives
The main objectives regulators  will generally have to focus on are:
o  the financial  viability of the operator:  ultimately,  if tariffs  (including subsidies)  do not
cover  costs,  private  operators  will  not be  able  to  meet  their  service  and  investment
obligations  and  potential  entrants  are unlikely  to be  interested.  Most  companies  are
willing to be in the red for the first few years  after they take  over the business, but for
the  short run  only.  The related  indicators  are  the IRR,  and  returns  over assets,  equity
and investments,  debt coverage ratios and profitability...
O  productive efficiency: this goal reflects the concern to push operators to minimize costs
for a given  level of production or to maximize production  for  a given level  of inputs.
One  of the problems  with  rate  of return  regulation  is  that  the  regime  itself does  not
promote  cost  minimization  while  price  or  revenue  caps  regimes  are  specifically
designed  to  improve  productive  efficiency.  Since  they  build  in  an  incentive  for  the
operator to avoid price cuts  by hiding efficiency  gains,  information gathering  becomes
even  more  critical  in these  regimes.  Related  indicators  are  production  or  coverage
levels for given input expenditure  levels.
o  allocative efficiency:  this  goal  reflects  the need  to ensure  that tariffs  reflect  marginal
costs.  There  are,  however,  many  distortions  in  the  factor  markets,  limited  credit
markets,  rigid  labor  markets  and  complex  tax  systems,  all  of which  are  completely
beyond  the  control  of the  regulator.  Related  indicators  reflect  changes  in the  input  or
output mixes as a result of changes in input or output prices.
o  dynamic ejficiency: this is a more subtle goal in that it tries to ensure that the operator
has  an  incentive  to  think  of future  users  and  invest  accordingly.  This  reinforces  the
importance  of  ensuring  that  tariffs  cover  costs,  including  the  cost  of  investments
needed for future users. Related indicators establish a linkage between demand forecast
and current investment levels.
o  distributional  fairness.  This  implies  that  tatiff  structures  for  each  user  type  are
consistent with the users'  ability to pay. When the govemment cannot credibly commit
to subsidies, regulators  often rely on cross-subsidies  aimed at helping  the poorest users.
Providing  these users with service through cheaper technology  or more modest quality
standards  may  achieve  the  goal  of  fairness.  Related  indicators  reflect  the  average
service bill spend for each user type, classified per income group.
Box  1 shows how  Argentina  has clearly specified  these  economic  goals  in the legislation
supporting  the electricity  distribution  tariff,  thereby clearly  spelling  out the  mandate  for
regulators.  It also illustrates the  importance of trade-offs  between  all these objectives.  For
instance,  Section  d)  of Article  40  aims  at productive  efficiency.... under  a  sustainability
constraint.  This is one of the many trade-offs that are likely to emerge.12
Box I: Defining  the Regulatory Objectives  in the Legislation:
The Case of Argentina's Electricity Distribution Tariffs
Law  24065  defining  the  Regulatory  Framework  for  the  Electricity  Sector  spells  out  a number  of clear
objectives  the regulator will have to meet.
The sustainability goal is defined in sections a) and d) of article 40 of chapter  10 as follows:
The  tariffs  will provide  the  transmission and  distribution companies  behaving in  an
economic  and prudent way  with  the  opportunity to  obtain enough  revenue  to  cover
reasonable  operational  costs related to the service, taxes, depreciation and a rate of return
determined through processes in agreement with article 41 of this law.
The allocative  efficiency  goal (that tariffs reflect costs) is spelled out in section b) of  article 40 and says that
tariffs:
Must  take  into  account reasonable differences  in  costs  between  the  various types  of
services, accounting for the form of service delivery, geographic location and any other
characteristic  the regulator  may consider  relevant.
Finally,  section d) of article 40 covers the productive  efficiency  goal  (minimize  costs) under a sustainability
constraint (compatible with supply reliability):
Subject  to  compliance  with  the  requirements  specified  in  the  previous  sections  ,the
regulator must  ensure  a  reasonable minimum  cost  to  the  users,  consistent  with  the
reliability of  supply
Fairness, from the viewpoint of non-discrimination,  is reflected m article 44::
No transmission or distribution company will be allowed to differentiate its tariffs, charges,
services or any other concept except when they are due to differences in location, service
type or any other equivalent reason approved by the regulator.
The social objectives,  even if they  are not included  explicitly  in the tariff sections  of the law are  addressed
through  the creation  of the National  Energy  Fund  (article  70)  whose  main  objective  is  to  transparently
subsidize  the access and use of electricity in the country.
In general,  the  primary  trade-offs  are found  in the  consideration  of the following
objectives:
*  Sustainability  and efficiency,
*  Efficiency andfairness,
*  Sustainability  andfairness
Sustainability and efficiency.  Marginal  cost  pricing  is  no  longer  the  exclusive  concern
when  asking  the private  sector to  finance  investment,  due to the  frequent  changes  in the
financing  costs of the operator.  At every tariff revision,  the regulator  will  have to  ensure
that the prices are consistent with the need to recognize the consequences  for the financial13
viability  of the  operator  of fluctuations  in  global  financial  markets.  This  is  particularly
important  in countries  where  the long term  borrowing  capacity is limited because of weak
credit  markets.  Most borrowing  is  short  term  and  therefore  short  term  fluctuations  have
immediate  impacts  on the financial state  of the operator.  This needs to impact the average
level just as much as the concern for efficiency revealed by the usual emphasis on long run
marginal  cost pricing.
Efficiency and  fairness. There  are  two  main  types  of trade-offs  related  to efficiency  and
fairness.  The  first  is  due  to  the  well-known  efficiency  consequences  of the use  of price
discrimination  in  favor of the poor  to achieve  equity  concerns.  Cross  subsidies have  long
been criticized  for this  specific  reason.  Many  governments  adopt  it when  their  ability to
finance  direct  subsidies  is  limited.  In  that  context,  cross-subsidies  may  indeed  be
unavoidable.  What  govemments  often  forget  is  that  each  design  will  have  different
efficiency effects.  The second trade-off is consistency  in the  allocation of efficiency gains
between  users  and  operators,  where  the  incentive  of the  operator  is  to  maximize  these
efficiency  gains.  The  strength of the incentive  for firms to cut costs is related  to the share
of the savings  it is allowed  to appropriate.  If all  gains must immediately be passed on  to
the  users,  there  is no  incentive  for  firms  to cut  costs,  since  cost-cutting  frequently  has  a
high initial  costly expense (staff,  equipment,  investments).  At the other extreme,  allowing
the  firm  to  keep  all  efficiency  gains  achieved  in the  delivery  of a  monopolistic  public
service  is  both socially  and politically  untenable  and defeats  the purpose of public utility
regulation.  Efficiency  gains  will  eventually  have  to be  shared  with the  users  through  a
combination  of lower tariffs and better service quality.
Sustainability  andfairness. Historic subsidy levels may not be consistent  with the desire to
guarantee the operator's  financial  viability.  The transition  from public to private provision
of infrastructure  services  often implies a review of many of the historic subsidy  levels  and
designs  tolerated  under  soft  budget  constraints  for  public  enterprises.  Once  a  private
operator  takes  over,  the  cost  of subsidies  becomes  a  much  more  serious  issue  and the
concern  for its  financial  sustainability  forces  the regulators  to  rethink  subsidy  levels  and
structures.  The  "privatization"  process  may  force  decisions  about  politically  sensitive
trade-offs.
The  existence  of these  trade-offs  and  the  related  political  sensitivities  imply that
regulatory regimes must  fit into  more formal processes  to ensure their political  acceptance
and  long  run  sustainability.  Typically,  these  concerns  center  around  processes  and
accountability.  Regulatory  regimes  must  be  simple,  justifiable  and  publicly  justified,
transparent,  non-conflictive  (they enjoy  wide  acceptance  by the  majority of actors),  and
fair  in  the  allocation  of  total  costs.  They  must  also  avoid  both  unjustified  price
discrimination  and excessively  fluctuating price  levels.  It is too often forgotten that models
such as those described here  are not only instruments  to check the quantitative consistency
but also the key to accountable  and acceptable processes  that ensure  the long run viability
of reforms.  The  transparency  contribution  of the  use of models  is  particularly  important
when  trade-offs  between  objectives  have  highly-differentiated  consequences  for  each
interest group.14
4.2. Regulatory Instruments
To achieve any combination of regulatory  objectives, the regulator can pick from a
wide  set of specific  instruments.  Figure  2 provides  a visual  description  of this  diversity.
The instruments  listed in this figure can be aggregated into three broad categones:
o  Regulatory regime
o  Contractual  obligations
o  Tariff level and design
Figure 2: The main policy instruments for regulators
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o  Cost of service or Rate of Return,
o  Price or revenue caps,  and
o  Hybrids.
Cost of service or rate of return. This  essentially consists  of fixing an upper limit  on the
mark-up  allowed  on  costs,  or equivalently,  on the rate of return  on  the regulated  firm's15
assets,  accounting  for  the  financial  sustainability  objective  of  the  firm.  The  main
responsibilities  of the regulator  are:  to  assess the various components  of the  total cost of
providing  the regulated  service,  to match these with the various categories  of users and to
then  assess  the  tariff  for  each  user  group,  accounting  for  their  unique  demand
characteristics.  This  implies  that  the  regulator  has  a good  grasp  of cost  drivers  and  the
demand side.
Tariff  revisions  are  implicitly  endogenous.  If  the  actual  rate  of  return  grows
significantly apart from the authorized rate of return due to changes  in costs, a revision will
be needed.  This implies  that the operator faces little risk to the extent that it knows that any
shock to its costs will quickly be passed on to users through tariff adjustments.  The main
drawback of this approach  is that it gives little incentive to the operator to cut costs. In fact,
to the contrary, it may give an incentive to overinvest,  including in quality,  since costs will
be reimbursed.
Price  or revenue cap. This essentially consists of setting an upper limit to the average tariff
for a service or the revenue  that can be generated by that service.  This is essentially done
as follows.  At the beginning of period  "t ", each operator sets its average tariff based on the
expected  inflation  and on the expected  efficiency gain  set by the regulator.  The main idea
is to provide  an incentive to the firm to cut costs and improve productive  efficiency  above
the levels set by the regulator when calculating the cap. The larger the wedge between  the
cap  and  the  realized  cost,  the  larger  the  profit rate.  The payoff  from  an  increase  in that
wedge  is  what drives  the  operator's  incentive  to cut  costs.  The regulator  generally  sets
minimum cost reduction targets expressed in terms of expected efficiency  gains built in the
specification of the price cap-this  is the X in the generic  RPI-X formula,  where RPI is a
retail  or wholesale  price  index  to  ensure  that the  cap  stays  constant  in  real  terms.  The
implementation  of the formula tends  to vary across  countries and sectors.  For instance,  in
its  original  design,  in  the UK,  the  adjustment  applied  to  a basket of goods  and services,
while in Latin America, the cap tends to be set for each good and service.
Whatever  the  specific  form  adopted,  the  cap  setting  follows  very similar  models
around  the  world.  In the  short run,  the regulator  can  set caps based  on best international
benchmarks-(accounting  for  any relevant  local  cost  or  demand  characteristics),  in  the
medium  run, the regulator needs  to know how far off the operator's  costs are from the best
benchmarks  and how fast  the operator  can  catch up.  This  is why both the operator's  cost
and the international cost benchmarks must be monitored by the regulator.  In a sense, this
behavior  allows the  regulator to  mimic  competition  in the market.  It is  not  an easy task.
Setting the cap too high may allow the operator to enjoy rents equivalent  to those achieved
by monopolies  well  beyond what is necessary  to provide  the  stimulus  to  cut costs.  The
challenge  is to set a tariff that ensures cash flows that are consistent  with a reasonable  rate
of return  on  assets,  and  compensate  for  prudent  and  efficient  operational  and  financial
expenditures.
Tariff revisions  in which  new  caps  are  set are  scheduled  to  take  place  every  4-5
years.  They  are  largely  exogenous  to  the  behavior  of the  firm.  They  are  designed  to
redistribute  some or all of the realized cost savings/efficiency  gains to the users.  This is a16
data  intensive  process  that takes  about  two  years  to prepare.  There  are  two  noteworthy
problems  with  this  type  of regime.  The  first  is  that  it  is  important  for the  regulator  to
monitor quality since  one easy way of cutting  costs  is to cut investment  in quality.  More
generally,  this  stems from  an  incentive  to  game investment  strategies with  a view  to cut
costs  or to misclassify maintenance  cost as investments  to meet the contractual  obligation
without  delivering  on the  investment.  The second problem  with this  form of regulation  is
that  it places  all  of the business risk on the operators. This  means that in  countries which
are  inherently  risky,  this  form  of regulation  can  become  an  impediment  to  investment
simply because it adds to the overall risk level.
Hybrid regimes.  In  between  these  two  regimes,  there  is a  large  number of intermediary
solutions  used  in  practice  that  add  some  guaranteed  reimbursement  to  incentive-based
regimes  or that  add incentives  to  some cost-based  regimes.  The most common  is  a price
cap with automatic  pass-through  of some costs  to users.  Under this  regime,  some  of the
costs  which  are not under the  control  of the operator  are  excluded  from  the cap  formula.
Any increase in these costs is automatically passed on to the users through a tariff increase.
In  electricity  or gas  distribution  for instance,  the  variability  of generation  prices  and  the
inability  of the  distribution  companies  to  do  much  about  it  (if they  are  not  vertically
integrated) explains why pass-throughs  are efficient.
The general formula for this kind of regime is:
T,= aC +(I -a)C
where  Tt  tariff for the service,
a  share of cost subject to caps;  it varies from  0 to  1;  if a=O,  the regime is  a
price cap regime; if a=l, it is cost-plus regime,
costs  subject to a cap, and
C  costs that can be shifted to users
The  adoption  of  a  hybrid  regime  (with  O<a<l)  is  generally  justified  by  the
existence  of costs that  the operators  cannot control  combined  with the need  to introduce
incentives.  The more volatile or unpredictable these uncontrolled costs, the more important
it is to adopt a regime that reduces the operator's risks.  Each specific hybrid regime design
decides how much of this uncertainty can be passed on to users. An alternative is to rely on
guarantees  or subsidies,  in  which  case the  taxpayer  ends  up  taking  on  part of the  risk.
Choosing between  one  approach  or the  other depends  on the  users'  ability  to pay  or the
government's  willingness  to  shift  service  investment  obligations  from  consumers  to
taxpayers.
Up  to  now  the  discussion  has  somewhat  ignored  the  existence  of inflation.  In
practice,  of course,  a major variable is the indexation rule adopted. The main purpose  is to
ensure  that  income  and  costs  are  recognized  in  real  terms  so  that  tariffs  can  be  also
predicted  in  real  terms  and  inflation  does  not  have  efficiency,  equity  or  sustainability17
effects.  The measurement  of inflation,  the base  year,  and its periodicity are crucial  in this
context.
4.2.2. Contractual Obligations
The contractual obligations of the operator can be aggregated into three main types:
o  Investment levels and timing,
o  Quality levels, and
o  Contract duration and termination rules
Investment levels and timing. Since in many countries the main purpose of looking for
private partners  in the delivery of public  services  is the need to gain  access to their ability
to  finance  investments,  a  major  concern  for  regulators  is  to  ensure  that  any  investment
commitment  related  to  the  partnership  is  enforced.  In  many  contracts,  the  privatization
teams prefer  to  set  output  targets  such  as  connection  rates  rather  an  investment  target.
Whether  directly  or indirectly,  investment  levels  are  viewed  as  an instrument  to achieve
coverage  goals.  The related amortization  rules  are one  of the most complex  matters  in the
practice  of regulation  and  are  often  a  major  source  of conflict.  Its  definition  and  design
have major effects on the incentive to invest and on the investment timing.
In many  cases  also,  the  timing of the  investment  is  seen by politicians  as  a  very
effective  instrument  to be coordinated  with election  cycles.  What  most of them  forget is
that the timing of investments matters  to cash flows and hence to the tariff levels needed to
ensure the financial viability of the firm and the users' ability to pay.  The rule of thumb to
remember  is that the  faster  the investment,  the higher  the tariff levels-although  there  is
generally  not a perfect correlation  since faster  investments  may  also  lead to new revenue
sources or more efficient operations.
Quality.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  regulatory  regime  has  an  impact  on  optimal
quality  levels. Cost-plus  regimes  lead to over-investment  in quality,  price  caps  to under-
investment.  One  way  for  the  regulator  to  offset  the  perverse  incentives  built  in  the
regulatory regime is to set caps or floors on quality, as appropriate.  It is important however
to  recognize  the various  dimensions  of quality.  Technical  standards  are  the  best  known
form of quality.  Service  quality is  as important and can be used by operators  to  cut costs
just  as  effectively.  Both  deserve  the  full  attention  of the  regulator  and  can  be  seen  as
regulatory  instruments.  A  related  instrument  is  the  level  of fines  associated  with  quality
violations.  The  correct  use  of these  instruments  requires  an  appropriate  modeling  of the
relationship  between  quality  and  costs  (investments,  O&M,..).  This  is  important  when
analyzing the consistency between  authorized tariffs and quality requirements  and the way
in which fines maintain the incentive of the operator to respect  this consistency.
Contract duration and termination rules. In  view  of the  long construction  periods
and the long life and specificity of the assets in the  sectors covered  here,  contract duration
and  termination  rules  are  quite  important  to  model.  The operators  need  to  have  enough
time  to recover  their investments  and be clear about  amortization  rules and  the rules  for18
transferring  or  selling  non-amortized  investments  at  the  end  of the  contract  duration.
Unclear or unfavorable  rules may suppress  any incentive  to invest too close to the end of
the contract period. Good rules are built into the costs and cash flows are monitored  for the
computation of tariffs.
4.2.3.  Tariff level  and structure
Tanff issues  emerge in two dimensions:  levels  and structure.  Ultimately,  all of the
main regulatory concerns will have to be reflected in the average tariff level.  This  level  is
computed  as  the  tariff that  allows  the  operator  to break  even  under  an  allowed  rate  of
return.  In  addition  to  this  reasonable  rate  of return,  it  accounts  for  the  invested  capital
assessed at reasonable  values and for reasonable  expected efficiency  gains all of which are
the responsibility of the regulator.  The preparation of this information must rely on a clear
accounting separation  of regulated  and unregulated  activities  and on a good understanding
of the  client  basis.  Regulators  must be able  to  answer  related  questions  such as  "do  the
operators have captive users?, do they know the ability of the poorest users to pay?.
This design of the tariff structure  is a complex  and often  an-underestimated  matter.
It can be left to the operator  to decide on its implementation.  Alternatively,  it can based on
guidelines  provided  by the  regulator.  The structure  may be  differentiated  in many ways:
across  clients, regions, between  fixed and variable costs, or according to the consumption
level.  This  is  why  the  type  and  degree  of cross-subsidies  a regulator  may  be  willing to
consider  and endorse in its efforts to accommodate both fiscal  and distributional as the cost
of some inefficiencies  is a particularly  important problem worth discussing in the context
of the modeling exercise presented here.
The social concerns  guidelines  are often adopted because  a regulator or  an operator
focusing only on  setting  efficient tariff levels  (following  a structure  close  to the one  that
would emerge  from Ramsey pricing) may hurt those with the least elastic  demand,  which
turns out to  be the poor or large  users with alternative  sources  of service.7 Allowing  the
regulator  to  simulate  various  types  of  tariff  structures  to  account  for  various  social
concerns  is  one of the most important uses of the regulatory  model.  This  implies that the
model must be based on a fairly disaggregated tariff structure and a good modeling of user
groups and characteristics,  including demand.
4.3. Matching Instruments with Objectives
There  is a reasonably  close relation between  various  goals and instruments,  which
can be summarized as follows:
*  Sustainability <  tariff levels, subsidies and regulatory regime;
*  Allocative  efficiency  <* the tariff structure;
*  Productive efficiency  X  the regulatory regime;  and
7  These may include auto-generation in power or direct purchasing  from generating  companies  m unbundled
systems.  For water,  large users may also self-provide  through their own wells, pumps, treatment equipment
or desalination plants.19
Fairness  <4  tariff structure  and various  contractual  obligations,  including
investment levels, speed and quality,  as well as the regulatory regime.
It should  be clear by now that the  financial  sustainability of the  operator  is driven
mainly by the average tariff level.  This tariff level should allow  an efficient firm to cover
its  costs  and  achieve  a  reasonable  rate of return.  If the tariff level  does  not  cover  costs,
subsidies  will be a complementaiy  option. However,  their design  may have  an impact on
allocative  efficiency  since  they  may  change  the  relative  price  between  regulated  and
unregulated  activities.  In highly unpredictable  markets,  the relationship  between the level
of risk and tariff levels  is  driven  by the regulatory  regime.  Price  caps  in  highly volatile
environments  combined  by  excessively  spaced  tariff  revisions  may  result  in  financial
unsustainability for the operator.
Within  regulated  activities,  allocative  efficiency  is  essentially  influenced  by the
tariff structure. Unless  the structure is closely (negatively)  related to the demand elasticity
of the various  users, allocative efficiency  is distorted.  There are many ways of creating this
distortion, as discussed earlier. Many of the structural designs, however, may reflect social
concerns,  revealing a major trade-off between these two regulatory objectives.
Next,  the tariff level  allowed for sustainability  has to be  consistent with the desire
to  achieve  productive  efficiency  (the  recovery  of  efficient  costs).  The  incentive  to
minimize  costs  is essentially  determined by  the design  of the  regulatory  regime,  as  seen
earlier. Price caps are more likely to achieve productive efficiency.
Finally,  fairness  is clearly associated with the design of the tariff structure since, in
addition  to subsidies,  it  is the  main mechanism used to match prices  with ability to pay.
The  regulatory  regime  also  matters  however  in  a  more  subtle  way  since  it, drives  the
relationship between the level of risk  and tariff levels.  Cost-plus regimes in highly volatile
environments  combined  with  excessively  spaced  tariff  revisions  may  result  in  frequent
price increases which may not be consistent with some of the users'  ability to pay.
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Ultimately,  what the regulator does is identify a tariff level that will generate a cash
flow consistent  with the  valuation  of the  firm,  which  in turn must be consistent with the
firm's opportunity cost of capital.  In other words, the regulator needs to focus on two main
groups of indicators:  (i)  the cost of capital, which is a hurdle  rate to decide if a tariff level
is reasonable  or not; and, (ii) the cash flows of the firm, which are used to assess the firm's
internal rate of return.  The ideal regulatory situation is one in which the tariff is set so that
a project/concession's  internal rate of return  is equal to the cost of capital.  For the project
to be attractive  to  a private operator,  the  internal  rate of return  of the  project must be  at
least equal to this cost of capital. When the cost of capital  is larger than the internal rate of
return,  the net present value of the project  is  negative.  We next  analyze these concepts  in
some detail.
5.1. The WACC  or cost of capital (CoC)20
From  an  economic  viewpoint,  the  WACC  represents  the  fair  rate  of return  to  a
company.  Its determination  is one of the main concerns of a regulator when preparing  for a
tariff setting or revision.
The  discussion  of its  computation  is  adapted  to LDC's  concerns  and  constraints.
The general formula is:
E  D
E+D  +rd(ltc)E+D
where  r,  is the cost of capital for the assets of the regulated operator,  re  is the opportunity
cost of equity,  r,  is the nominal  cost of debt,  t.  is the corporate  income  tax rate, E is the
degree of capitalization  of the firm or its equity level, D is the market value of its net debt
and E+D  is the value of the firm's assets.
The estimation of the cost of equity is usually based on an adaptation of the Capital
Asset  Pricing  Model  (CAPM)  to  reflect  some  of the  realities  of developed  economies.
Simplifying somewhat,  it is the sum of three components:  the first two  are the  same as in
developed countries  (the rate of return on a risk-free asset and the risk premium specific to
the firm or the sector, reflecting the quality of the restructuring  or regulation), and the third
is a country-specific  risk (CR):
r  = rf +A  e(r  -rf)+CR
where  rf  represents the return on a risk-free  asset,  rm  is the return on a diversified
portfolio in a developed country, and the difference  (rm  - rf )  constitutes the systematic
market risk or the undiversifiable  risk and /'e  represents  the correlation between the firm's
risk and the market risk and is influenced by the regulatory regime
Similarly, the cost of debt now needs to reflect CR as well:
rd = rf  +  CR
Typically,  assuming  that  large public  utilities  have  good  credit rating,  the cost of
debt can be approximated by the return on public bonds in the country.
Figure  3 shows  the  main  factors  driving the  cost  of capital.  It provides  a  more
complex  picture  than  the  simplified  analytical  framework  presented  here  with  respect  to
risk.  Indeed,  country risk is  driven by many factors,  including exchange  rate and  political
risks,  among  others  for  instance.  Analysts  often  consider  those  in  isolated  ways  when
assessing the nsk premia to be assigned to a country.21
Figure 3:
What doIve  the cost Of cap0taOT
tO$t onf CEpRfll
1Leverage  hi~k  Gurateest$  S3rEuirR  Igitio0
Exchange rate  Polifical  Sector  Project  Commercial
5.2. The internal rate of return (E[RR)
To be able to assess the internal  rate of return, the regulator must know what drives
the value of the assets used by the firm, which implies that it must be able to forecast cash
flows. We review here the various  ways in which cash flows can be assessed:
o  equity cashflow,
o  capital  cashflow, and
o  free cashflow.
All concepts start from an assessment of operational  cash flows:
Operational  Revenue - Operational Costs - Provision  for unrecoverable 8
= Earnings  before interests, taxes, depreciation  and amortization  (EBITDA)
also,
8 This provision is somewhat included  in the operational  costs.22
EBITDA  - Investments - Changes in working capital
= Operational Cash Flow (OCF)
This formula  shows that the OCF represents  the net flow of funds collected by the
firm in each period. It is clear that the regulated tariff is a key determinant  of this cash flow
as well as  any regulatory measure  influencing  costs. All other cash flow concepts build on
this one accounting  for various aspects of the financing structure of the firm.
5.2.1. Equity cash flow
Equity cash flow  focuses  on  the  cash  flow available  to the  shareholders  in each
period,  once the firm has met all of its commitments  to its creditors.  This measure  is used
to assess the profitability of the firm's stocks:
Operational  Cash Flow (OCF) - Cash Flow  for debt service = Equity Cash Flow
5.2.2. Capital cash flow
Capital  cash  flow  focuses  on  the  cash  flow  available  to both  shareholders  and
creditors.  It provides an overview of the value  of the firm.  It is measured as follows:
Operational  Cash Flow - Taxes
[where Taxes = (tc  * earnings before taxes or  EBT)]
= Capital Cash Flow
Taxes are calculated  by applying  the tax rate  tc on the  earning before taxes.  In this
method, tax savings due to interest payments are deducted from taxable income.
5.2.3. Free cash  flow
Among  regulated  firms,  the  most  common  approach  to  valuation  is  Free  Cash
Flow.  Similar to the  capital  cash  flow, the  focus  is on the  cash  flows  available  to  both
shareholders  and  creditors.  The  main  difference  is  that  the  tax  savings  from  interest
payments  are included  in the discount rate rather  than in the effective tax  liabilities  of the
firm. This is done as follows:
Operational  Cash Flow - Taxes  where Taxes = [tc * (EBT + Interests)]
= Free cash flow
Figure 4 provides  a visual  representation  of the key factors driving  cash  flows  and
hence IRR.  The figure also  illustrates the fact that not all sources of cash flow  fluctuations23
are driven by the operator or the regulator.  They share the responsibility of influencing  the
ERR.
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5.3. The relationship between l[RR and the CoC
At the beginning  of the process, the discount rate used to calculate the net present
value of the cash flow  is the  weighted average  cost of capital (WACC)  discussed earlier.
The  appropriate  average  tariff is the  one  that ensures  a net present value of zero  at  that
discount rate.  Any change  in the operational  conditions or to the cost of capital will result
in  an  imbalance  between  the  internal  rate of return  and the  cost  of capital.  If this  is  a
structural  change,  the  scheduled,  and  sometimes  unscheduled,  tariff revisions  will  be
designed to restore the equilibrium.
5.4. Accounting for inflation.
A first decision to take in developing  an economic and financial  model is to decide
whether  forecasts  will  be  made  in  nominal  or  real  terms.  Since  much  of the  exercise
consists  of forecasting  expenditures  and  revenue  that  combine  both volume  and prices,
when working in nominal terms, it is important to also forecast inflation. This forecast can
then be included  in all cash flows and the discount rate. The relationship between  real and
nominal cash flow is then represented as follows:24
RealCashFlow,  =  Nominal Cash Flow,
where  7X represents  expected inflation.
As for the discount rate, the adjustment is done as follows:
(I  +  r,)
_  r  (1+  )
where  rr represents the discount rate in real terms and  r,,  in nominal terms.
In the model presented here, the estimation of the cash flow is done in real terms at
the  initial  price  level.  This  is  the  easiest  solution  to  not  have  to  deal  with  possible
differentiated  forecasts  for  costs  and  revenue.  The  only  variables  initially  estimated  in
nominal terms and then deflated are the financial variables, since financial markets work in
nominal terms. The main difficulties arise in addressing  those variables for which inflation
is  not  neutral.  Tax  liabilities  are  a  common  example.  The  way  most  countries  handle
inflation  in the tax code  implies  that regulators  are likely  to overestimate  cash  flows  and
hence  the  value  of  the  firm.  Another  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  the  financial
statements  reflect  historical  costs  rather  than  replacement  costs.  This  may  also  lead  to
distortions in asset valuation.
5.5 Accounting  for the effects  of the exchange  rate
An  important  issue to  consider when developing  this kind  of models  is related  to
the  exchange  rate  and  the  effects  of  its  variations  on  the  economic  forecasts  and,
consequently,  on the firm's cash flow.  Several  effects can take place, among  others:  from
an  operational  point of view,  costs and  investments  in  regulated  industries  usually have
imported  components.  On  the  other  hand,  from  a  financial  point  of view,  these  firms
usually take debt in foreign currency.  Additionally, fluctuations of the exchange rate affect
the  domestic inflation  and, therefore,  the cash flow.  It is important to be able to assess the
effects  of a devaluation  through  different  assumptions  about:  the proportion  of costs  and
investment components  affected  by the exchange  rate, the  effects  of the  exchange rate  on
inflation,  the  share  of  ass.et  base  acknowledged  in  foreign  currency  and  the  firm's
proportion of foreign debt, among others.
5.6. Accounting  for other idiosyncrasies.
There  are a number of additional considerations  worth mentioning.  The first is that
obviously  not  all  countries  have  the  same  accounting  practices.  This  means  that  the
regulators  must be quite  careful  when learning  from each other's  experiences.  Related  to
this is the fact that tax systems  are also country-specific  and international  comparisons  are
rendered  difficult  as  a  result.  A  third  major  concern  is  that  every  sector  has  its  own
idiosyncrasies.  The modelers  must know very well the sectors  they are working on.  This25
means both on the engineering side to model the cost structure and on the economic side to
model  the  demand.  The  demand  is  particularly  important  when  modeling  the  tariff
structure.
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In the processes of utilities privatization,  ordinary and extraordinary tariff revisions
or  contract  renegotiations,  the  Regulator  always  arbitrates  between  the  interests  of the
various  actors -such  as  users,  operators  and  government-  who  participate  directly in  the
service  and  has  to  achieve  certain  goals  using  the  available  regulatory  instruments.  The
multiplicity  of variables  and  interests  that  simultaneously  take  part  in  such  processes
require  that  they  are  performed  within  an  integral,  consistent  and transparent  analytical
framework capable of quantifying the impact of regulatory decisions.
The  integrity  of the  process  implies  that  the  Regulator  carries  out  the  analysis
through indicators  which account for the economic, financial and operating performance  of
the  firm  and,  for this  purpose  then,  the  Regulator  needs  to  consider  all  the  variables
affecting  the  economic  equation,  the  minimum  needs  of  finance  and  the  operator's
operating conditions at the same time.
The transparency  of a regulatory  process  is reflected  when all the relevant  factors
affecting  the  economic  and financial  variables  of service provision  are accounted  for and
participants have access to such information.
The  consistency  of  the  analysis  requires  that  all  the  variables  affecting  the
indicators  which  show  the  operator's  performance  are  combined  in  such  a  way  that
properly represents  the behavior of market participants  as  well as sector,  (quasi)economic
and  financial  relations  and  constrains.  This  guarantees  that  the  implementation  of
regulatory  instruments  has  a quantitative  effect  which  reflects  the  actual  situation  of the
concession under study.
For  the  regulatory  process  to  meet  these  characteristics,  it  may  be  performed
through the implementation of a regulatory model which combines  the variables describing
the initial condition of the service, the objectives  and the regulatory  instruments.  Thus, the
model  represents  the  tool  allowing the  Regulator  to simulate,  analyze  the  sensitivity  and
set new scenarios  in relation to the future evolution  of service provision under a scheme  of
rigorous quantification that, also, prevents the introduction of factors which would turn the
results  subjective.  The  model  presented  here  can  perform  all  the  functions  that  any
financial  model  of a  firm would perform  but it is designed  with a longer term  view  and
includes  an  explicit  identification  of  the  key  regulatory  instruments.  Thus,  one  of the
elements  to be taken  into account by the Regulator  is  that service  provision  requires  that
the  firm  get enough  revenues  to  cover operating  costs,  investments  on  fixed  assets  and
working capital and to obtain a return equivalent to the opportunity cost of capital. For this
purpose,  the model forecasts  the net cash flow and the IRR  of the business which  is  then
compared to the  cost of capital  to get the value that the regulatory  instruments  should take26
in order to meet  sustainability of service provision.  Moreover,  the model  also includes  in
the forecasted  financial  statements,  the key indicators  to analyze  the  financial  viability  of
the business, which is also to be considered  in the regulatory process.
Although  a  regulatory  model  represents  a  tool  allowing  the  development  of  an
appropriate  regulatory  process,  it  also  poses,  at  least,  two  important  challenges  to
regulators.  The  first  is  that  it  is  necessary  to  use  uniform  quantifications  of
(quasi)economic  and  financial  perspectives  of regulatory  decisions.  Then,  the regulator is
asked to focus  on the  analysis  of a group  of variables  such  as  the cost of capital  and the
internal  rate of return  as well  as to fully understand  the economic  and financial  concepts
generating the trade-offs  of various regulatory  and policy instrument combinations  in terms
of their impacts  on these indicators.  The other challenge  arising out of the implementation
of a regulatory model  lies  on the fact that the quality of the results will  depend, basically,
on  the  quality  of the  data  used.  This  requires  the  regulator  to  generate  a  set  of data
including quantification of the capital asset,  information  on the service supply and demand
and  financial  information.  Said  data  should  have  a  structure  consistent  with  the  model
requirements.
Finally,  from  a  practical  point of view,  it  is  important  to bear  in  mind  that the
analysis  that  can be performed  with  a regulatory  model has  certain  limitations.  The most
important  limitation  arises  from  the  imposition  of  using  spreadsheets,  although  the
development of software programs  has remarkably broadened the spectrum of the analysis
to  be  carried  out  with  them.  On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the
implementation  of a model  appears  as  a way  to represent  the reality under  analysis  in  a
simplified manner.  Therefore,  the simplicity in operating the model, on the one hand, and
the degree  of disaggregation of the variables representing  the real world, on the other,  will
depend on the simplifying assumptions.IPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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